LOWY INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

A N A L Y S I S

DR MICHAEL FULLILOVE
Program Director
Global Issues
Tel: +61 2 8238 9040
mfullilove@lowyinstitute.org

The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-building

Executive summary

The phenomenon of state failure and its remedies constitute a growth area of international politics, partly because of the recognition that state failure generates security threats and partly because it is so very difficult. This Lowy Institute Analysis identifies the critical elements of one small but significant case, about which there is growing international interest: the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The background to the mission was the long-standing tension between the peoples of the two main islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita, which developed in the period 1998-2002 into militant violence which then mutated into widespread criminality and thuggery. Acting on a request from Honiara, the Australian Government and its regional partners elected to lead a new kind of state-building intervention.

RAMSI, which was deployed in July 2003, had eight defining characteristics: it was preventive; permissive; regional in nature; nationally led; supported by the United Nations; non-sovereign; police led; and light in touch. The mission has made significant progress, securing law and order, arresting the country's perilous decline and placing it on a new trajectory. RAMSI must now translate its early successes into progress on economic reform and clean government, while maintaining political support, helping Solomon Islanders to address the root causes of the tensions, and working out the conditions under which it can leave. The national election taking place on 5 April 2006 and the formation of a new government in the following weeks will be important tests for the mission.

The Testament of Solomons

Abbreviations

ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AFPPS	Australian Federal Police Protective Service
ASPI	Australian Strategic Policy Institute
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
EU	European Union
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IPMT	International Peace Monitoring Team
MEF	Malaita Eagle Force
MFAT	New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
NSS	United States National Security Strategy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PPF	Participating Police Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RSIP	Royal Solomon Islands Police
SIRA	Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority
TPA	Townsville Peace Agreement
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMBIH	United Nations Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group to Croatia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

The Testament of Solomons

Introduction: state-building and Solomons

Few issues in international politics have attracted more interest in recent years, and generated more activity, than the phenomenon of state failure. National leaders and scholars alike are grappling with the questions of how to pull weak states back from the precipice, and rehabilitate those which have fallen over. The Congress and other legislatures have passed bills; foreign offices and agencies including the US State Department, the British Prime Minister's Strategy Unit and AusAID have created new offices and programs; and world leaders meeting in New York have agreed to establish a new intergovernmental institution, the Peacebuilding Commission.[1]

The reason for all this attention is that state weakness is important: in Francis Fukuyama's words, 'an international issue today of the first order.' In failing states, sorrows come not as single spies but in battalions: lawlessness, civil war, corruption, political or ethnic division, breakdown of government services, economic meltdown. Furthermore human suffering is not the end of it; failing states can produce real security threats in the form of illegal people movements, organised crime, weapons and drugs trafficking, and even terrorism. The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), for example, states that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones' – a statement that is probably even truer now, in the middle of the Iraq imbroglio, than when the NSS was issued a year after 9/11.[2]

If reinforcing and rebuilding weak states is vital, though, it is also hard. It is hard for foreigners to build strong indigenous institutions – almost as hard as it is to impose democracy without consent. 'Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and time-consuming as reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies... Historically, nation-building attempts by outside powers are notable mainly for their bitter disappointments, not their triumphs.'[3]

The purpose of this Lowy Institute Analysis is to describe and analyse one innovative example of state-building, which has had early success and about which there is growing international interest: the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). It does not make grand claims about the applicability of the RAMSI model to other weakened states: the scale of the challenge in Solomon Islands is radically different from that in, say, Afghanistan or Iraq, and we know that the success or failure of state-building owes at least as much to national conditions as it does to operational approaches. The streets of New York, Geneva and Washington, DC are paved with 'lessons learned' reports; this paper will not add to them. Rather, the aim is to identify the critical elements of one small but significant case and place it in an international context. The study concludes with a short account of the mission's future challenges.[4]

Nomenclature can be highly sensitive in this field. States are understandably reluctant to be dubbed 'failed' or 'broken'; hence the search for euphemisms such as 'countries at risk of instability'. State failure describes a situation in which 'the basic functions of the state are no longer performed'; however the term covers 'a continuum of circumstances... ranging from states in which basic public services are neglected to the total collapse of governance.' (Sinclair Dinnen notes that 'state failure' is a problematic concept in the Pacific, as it implies

The Testament of Solomons

that at one time the state functioned effectively.)[5] The term 'state-building' refers to 'efforts to reconstruct… an effective indigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity has been seriously eroded.' It is used in preference to 'nation-building', which is common in the United States but refers implicitly to intangibles that are largely beyond the power of international interventions, such as the forging of a common national consciousness; and 'peace-building', which is common throughout the United Nations system but which includes a wider range of post-conflict activities.[6]

Solomon Islands and the tensions

Solomon Islands is a tiny former British protectorate in the southwest Pacific, lying to Australia's northeast. Its population of 500,000 people is spread across an archipelago of nearly one thousand islands, though more than half live on the two main islands, the conjoined twins of Guadalcanal and Malaita. The country was named by the Spanish, who believed that King Solomon's mines were located there; in the twentieth century it achieved fame as the site where a US patrol torpedo boat, PT 109, commanded by Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, was sunk during the Second World War.

From the beginning, the Solomon Islands state was weak and compromised. The government was poorly prepared to manage its colonial inheritance; like many post-colonial states it had state structures without state traditions. Below the formal institutions of parliamentary democracy lay a loosely organised system of traditional leadership revolving around 'big men'; collisions between these new and old systems were not infrequent. Public servants

and politicians were often expected to provide for their kin members – or wantoks – before responding to the demands of the broader citizenry. Resources were diverted increasingly from national to personal and familial ends. Corruption and weak leadership, when combined with the lack of a cohesive national identity, meant that the state was never able to forge a meaningful connection with the majority of Solomon Islanders.[7]

Such a state was not well positioned to deal with the tensions between the peoples of Guadalcanal and Malaita – tensions that flowed from issues of history, ethnicity, money and land. The shift of the national capital to Guadalcanal after the Second World War accelerated internal migration flows and Malaitans came to dominate Honiara and its circles of political and economic influence. In the 1990s land issues came to the fore, as the purchase of and squatting on customary land by Malaitan settlers generated resentment among the Guadalcanalese. The tensions spilled over in the period 1998-2002 in the form of organised violence. Groups of Guadalcanalese militants, subsequently known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), came to dominate rural Guadalcanal, forcing twenty thousand Malaitans into Honiara. The Malaitan elite soon began issuing its own compensation claims for displacement and loss of life, and the second half of 1999 saw the emergence of a militia group known as the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). Solomons was descending into ethnic conflict. During 2000 there were clashes between militants and the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP); Prime Minister Bart Ulufa'alu requested assistance from Australia but he was denied it. On 5 June 2000, the MEF with the support of elements of the RSIP

The Testament of Solomons

commandeered the police armoury and forced the Prime Minister to resign at gunpoint.[8]

Civil war was averted by the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) of October 2000, brokered by Australia and New Zealand. The TPA established a framework for the cessation of hostilities between the IFM and the MEF, providing for a weapons amnesty, reform of the RSIP, demilitarisation and rehabilitation of militants, compensation for property damage, processes of reconciliation, and increased provincial autonomy. Its provisions would be monitored and enforced by a Peace Monitoring Council, which would be assisted by an International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). However law and order problems continued, indeed worsened. The Solomon Islands Government did not have the capacity to enforce the TPA and the unarmed and loosely mandated IPMT was inadequate to meet the security challenge. Policing remained ineffective and powerful firearms remained available.

Ethnic violence soon mutated into criminality and thuggery, including arson, kidnap, looting, assault, shootings, torture, rape and extrajudicial executions; 150 or 200 weapons-related deaths are thought to have occurred. By early 2003, the state was in serious danger of failing. David Hegarty provides this summary: 'the government was unable to govern… the PM and senior officials were constantly intimidated by armed gangs with weapons, some ministers were engaged in illegal and corrupt practices, the police force was fractured, corrupted and compromised, government services to the community had become almost non-existent, the public service was a shattered shell, crime in the capital had brought most commerce and movement to a halt, most provinces were demanding increased

autonomy from the centre.' The economic numbers are just as eloquent. The national GDP decreased by a full quarter between 1998 and 2002, against the background of a rapidly increasing population; extortion drained the government's finances; formal government debt increased by more than 40% in 2002 alone; the government defaulted on loan interest payments; major businesses closed; exports fell.[9]

The Australian Government's response

Consistent with the Australian Government's habit of non-intervention in the affairs of Pacific states, Canberra rejected various requests from the Solomon Islands Government over this period for comprehensive assistance, although the bilateral aid budget was increased dramatically. On 8 January 2003, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer expressed the orthodox position in an opinion piece in The Australian:

> Sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon Islands would be folly in the extreme. It would be widely resented in the Pacific region. It would be very difficult to justify to Australian taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? The real show-stopper, however, is that it would not work – no matter how it was dressed up, whether as an Australian or a Commonwealth or a Pacific Islands Forum initiative. The fundamental problem is that foreigners do not have answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands.[10]

The Testament of Solomons

Even as Downer's comment was being published, however, the Government – aware that the situation in Solomons was bad and deteriorating and that Australian aid was being undermined by criminality – was starting to consider a major policy shift. On 22 April a new request for assistance was received from Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza, and in the first week of June Kemakeza visited Canberra and met with Australian Prime Minister John Howard and officials. On 5 June the Australian PM gave his Solomons counterpart a 'Framework for Strengthened Assistance to Solomon Island', which set out the basis for an Australian-led mission. A few days later the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) released a report supporting intervention; although its prescription differed in important ways from the Government's model, its preparation had probably helped to prompt officials' thinking and its publication provided political cover for the initiative about to be launched.[11]

On 25 June the Government took a formal decision that, conditional upon support from the Solomons authorities and the Pacific Islands Forum, it would intervene in a way that was strikingly different from Australian policy in recent decades. That support was soon forthcoming in a flurry of activity: an endorsement by the Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting on 30 June; a formal request dated 4 July from Governor-General Fr Sir John Ini Lapli for a package of regional assistance 'to restore law and order, security and economic sustainability to Solomon Islands'; the 17 July passage through the Solomon Islands Parliament of enabling legislation setting out the powers and immunities of personnel engaged in the operation; and a formal agreement between participating states on 24

July.[12] The fruit of all this was an operation named Operation Helpem Fren (pidgin for 'helping friends') and its institutional expression, RAMSI.

It is impossible for anyone who was not in the Cabinet Room in Canberra's Parliament House to say definitively what led to this important policy shift, but it was probably a combination of five factors. First, there was the growing view – less than two years after 9/11, and only nine months after the first Bali bombing, in which 202 people including 88 Australians were killed – that failed states can threaten the security of countries such as Australia. Publicly the Government cited the threat of terrorism, although one insider admits this was 'a pretext rather than a motive'; it is difficult to imagine a less likely base for Islamist terrorists than Solomon Islands. A more plausible risk was that Solomons could become a locus of transnational crime including drug-running and money-laundering. Second, there was the humanitarian imperative: the risk of what Prime Minister Howard called a 'downward spiral which, if not addressed, could result in the total collapse of the Solomon Islands' governance and sovereignty', with disastrous results for its people. Third, there was a concern that a failing Solomons could damage regional stability, with problems leaking into Bougainville and undermining Papua New Guinea (PNG). Fourth, the intervention promised to help meet the contradictory demands of alliance management and domestic politics at a time when the US was casting around for additional foreign troops for its occupation of Iraq, which was becoming increasingly unpopular in Australia. Canberra's leadership in Solomons demonstrated to Washington and other allies that Australia was stepping up to the plate on the issue of failed

The Testament of Solomons

states in the Pacific; by contrast, it demonstrated to the Australian electorate that its Government was prepared to act independently, and take a leading role in a major operation. As John Howard put it: 'The Solomons is our patch.'[13]

The final, critical, element was that success seemed to be achievable. As one official told this author, the situation had become so bad that Solomon Islands was in danger of failing completely; on the other hand the situation had resolved itself from the brink of civil war (in which it is usually unwise to meddle) into a severe law and order problem. The situation appeared fixable for a country the size of Australia, in light of its experience on Bougainville and the success of Australia's recent deployments to East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.

A certain amount of cynicism was expressed at the time about the Government's motives in establishing RAMSI. But this is beside the point. Governments usually have multiple motives for action, and national and political interests are always among them – as they should be. One of the great problems in relation to failing states is the lack of will on the part of developed states to lend a hand, so we should hesitate to complain when one does.

RAMSI's progress to date

On 24 July 2003 the first RAMSI personnel were deployed in Solomon Islands. Australian soldiers landed close to Red Beach, where US Marines had gone ashore in 1942; civilian, military and police personnel from Australia, New Zealand and Fiji landed at Henderson Field on RAAF Hercules aircraft. Over the

following weeks the number of personnel increased rapidly and the RAMSI ink-blot spread quickly out from Honiara. Mission personnel numbers peaked at about 2250 in September-October 2003, comprising 1800 military, 300 police, and civilian advisers. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) contributed about 1500 personnel, including infantry, signallers and engineers, Iroquois helicopters, transport and surveillance aircraft and five Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels. The military component was drawn down from late October in the wake of early successes in restoring security; the steady state deployment is only about seventy troops, drawn in rotation from Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, PNG and Fiji. The critically important police component, known as the Participating Police Force (PPF), has remained relatively constant in size (in February 2006 it comprised 288 officers), with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and its Protective Service (AFPPS) contributing about half its numbers, supplemented by officers from the Pacific states of New Zealand, PNG, Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Nauru, Samoa, Kiribati, Tuvalu and Cook Islands. The civilian element initially comprised about 40 advisers but is now well over 100, working in both line jobs and advisory positions in Solomon Island agencies including the Ministry of Finance, Attorney-General's Department, the courts, Public Solicitor's Office, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Prisons Service, Electoral Commission, and the accountability institutions of the Auditor-General, Ombudsman and Leadership Code Commission.[14]

To date RAMSI has been very successful, arresting Solomon Islands' perilous decline and placing it on a path to recovery. In the first 12-18 months the mission's principal focus was the

The Testament of Solomons

restoration of law and order, the area which has seen the greatest gains. A series of quick wins was achieved in the first weeks of the intervention – a joint PPF-RSIP foot patrol took place within two hours of arrival, for example, and the first police post was established outside Honiara within two weeks. On day 21 the notorious Guadalcanalese militant, murderer and former police officer Harold Keke surrendered peacefully, a development described by one official as 'a killer blow – if RAMSI could get Keke, they could do anything.' An initial three week weapons amnesty netted nearly 4,000 firearms and over 300,000 rounds of ammunition and weapons destruction ceremonies were staged throughout the country. The amnesty was valuable symbolically as well as operationally, building confidence in the mission, filling time while militia were targeted, prompting interaction between Islanders and RAMSI personnel, and spreading the message that the time for violence had passed. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 (the Brahimi Report) advocated 'quick impact projects aimed at real improvements in quality of life, to help establish the credibility of a new mission'; the RAMSI experience confirms the wisdom of that approach.[15]

Law and order continues to be RAMSI's strong suit. A number of former militants have been prosecuted and found guilty of murder and other offences and jailed for long terms. The PPF is moving away from frontline policing and investigations and toward reform and restructuring of the RSIP, significant elements of which were associated with belligerents during the tensions. One-quarter of the RSIP's officers have been removed and more than 160 former officers arrested on nearly 600 charges. Recruitment of new officers, including

participants from all provinces and many more women than before, has been stepped up and training processes overhauled.

The security situation in Solomons is not perfect, as evidenced by occasional incidents on Guadalcanal's Weather Coast and the tragic killing of AFPPS officer Adam Dunning in December 2004. Some honest RSIP officers have been left behind by the bewildering pace of change in their organisation, which may have deleterious long-term consequences. Furthermore a perception remains that some well-connected 'big fish' in the Parliament and even the Cabinet have so far escaped punishment for their sins. Nonetheless, the re-establishment of law and order in Solomon Islands was a critical achievement. Early provision of a secure environment – which was also achieved in East Timor but not in Cambodia, Haiti or Kosovo – is critical to the success of any state-building effort because it provides the essential foundation for economic growth and revived institutions and civil society. The Solomon Islands journalist Robert Iroga told this author that for him RAMSI means he can write articles and express opinions without placing his life at risk – and that is no small thing.[16]

RAMSI's remit is much broader than law and order, however: the mission is very active in rebuilding Solomons institutions and reforming its economy. On the institutional side, there are projects under way to: strengthen parliamentary processes (funded through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)); support the Solomons Islands Electoral Commission (delivered via the Australian Electoral Commission); revamp Cabinet processes and ensure they are followed; recruit and train public servants; improve

The Testament of Solomons

public sector corporate planning; improve governance at the provincial level; deliver civic education programs; and, crucially, to support the accountability institutions. On the economic side RAMSI began by getting a grip on Solomon Islands' haemorrhaging public finances, stabilising the budget and strengthening financial management. An Australian Accountant-General has the difficult but vital job of approving payments from the public purse. RAMSI has moved to improve revenue collection and broaden the tax base and regularise debt; it has worked with the Solomon Islands Government on the reopening of enterprises such as the Gold Ridge mine and the Guadalcanal Plains palm oil plantation. Public servants are now being paid on time and the provinces are receiving their annual grants.

These are all important steps and most have been executed well. There is not yet enough evidence, however, to be confident about the sustainability of this success if RAMSI were to leave. In particular, the path to economic independence is likely to be long and winding. The past two years have seen moderate inflation and good growth, driven by expansion of fishing, agriculture and forestry as well as donor support. However a bracing report from the IMF in October 2005 noted that Solomon Islands – the poorest country in the Pacific – faces intimidating medium-term challenges, including rapid population growth and the decline of logging from its present unsustainable levels. The IMF estimated that on current trends it would take almost thirty years of 4.5% annual growth simply to reach pre-conflict per capita GDP.[17]

As with most issues, though, Solomon Islanders seem to have faith that RAMSI can pull it off. The mission has enjoyed consistently high levels of popular support from the time RAMSI personnel were welcomed by thousands of cheering people in July 2003. A recent review by an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) of the Pacific Islands Forum concluded that 'the support and appreciation for the work of RAMSI thus far was quite overwhelming.' Opinion polls bear out this anecdotal evidence: Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard Brown have pointed out that public trust in RAMSI and PPF regularly tops 80%, which is much higher than satisfaction levels with UN civilian police (CIVPOL) in other missions. Even criticism of the mission within Solomons – of which there is certainly more now than two years ago – is usually prefaced with a comment such as 'I'm not anti-RAMSI, but...'. TIME magazine referred to a 'cult of RAMSI... The freshly minted brand has gained the status of saviour and sorcerer with a long-suffering people, who utter the acronym in respectful whispers or with toothy smiles.'[18]

The RAMSI model

The model developed by the Australian Government and its partners for the RAMSI intervention was unique. It had eight key features: it was preventive; permissive; regional in nature; nationally led; supported by the United Nations; non-sovereign; police led; and light touch.

Preventive
As described above, Solomon Islands was in a parlous condition in mid-2003. The state was weak and vulnerable – but it had not yet failed. Some level of functioning government continued; the state was not itself a belligerent in the tensions; infrastructure was relatively intact; no humanitarian disaster had yet

The Testament of Solomons

occurred. Rather the state was heading in the direction of failure. RAMSI was in the nature, then, of a preventive action: in Richard Ponzio's view it 'arguably broke new ground in lowering the threshold for intervention in the indisputably internal affairs of a sovereign state... To a degree not witnessed in international peacekeeping, insidious levels of crime, corruption and poor governance had become a primary impetus for external intervention, rather than a large humanitarian crisis.' In this regard RAMSI was exceptional. Usually political will on the part of wealthy and powerful states fails to coalesce until it is too late, thereby preventing the translation of early warnings into effective action. Yet as Robert Rotberg has argued, 'strengthening weak states against failure is far easier than reviving them after they have definitively failed or collapsed.'[19]

Permissive
RAMSI was an intervention by consent, implemented only after formal requests from the Prime Minister and Governor-General of the Solomon Islands as well as the unanimous passage of the enabling legislation through the country's Parliament. Despite claims to the contrary, Operation Helpem Fren bore no resemblance to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Legally, the host state's consent meant the mission did not offend the principle of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter; politically, it was the sine qua non for support from the Solomon Islands and Australian publics as well as regional states and the international community.[20]

Regional in nature
One of the mission's strengths has been its regional nature. RAMSI was initiated under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, the regional organisation comprising the sixteen independent island nations of the Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand. It took place within the framework of the Forum's Biketawa Declaration of 2000 – a document which sets out principles of good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights and recognises 'the need, in times of crisis or in response to members' request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the extended Pacific Islands family' – and it was endorsed by Forum heads of government and foreign ministers. Forum members receive reports on RAMSI's progress and the Forum's EPG reviewed the mission in May 2005. RAMSI's personnel also has a regional element, with eleven Pacific states having contributed people to the mission.[21]

The Australian Government's decision to constitute RAMSI as a regional mission – against alternative advice in favour of an ad hoc multilateral agency modelled on interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bougainville, possibly including Britain, Japan, France, the EU, the Commonwealth and the ASEAN Regional Forum[22] – was both politic and sensible. It increased the perceived legitimacy of the operation, both inside and outside the Solomons, and it had operational advantages because of the familiarity of the Pacific personnel with Melanesian culture and ways of doing things. (The PNG Defence Force, for instance, did a good job on the troublesome Weather Coast.) Indeed, a regular (and not unjustified) criticism of RAMSI is that it should increase its Pacific representation, in terms of numbers, seniority and visibility.[23]

The Testament of Solomons

Operation Helpem Fren took place against a background of substantial regional involvement in peace-building – in fact about two-thirds of current peace-building missions are carried out by entities other than the UN, including regional bodies, organisations and individual states. In principle, the national interests of regional countries are more likely to be engaged in a local failing state than a distant one: this can be both an advantage (by increasing their likelihood of participating in an intervention) and a disadvantage (by potentially eroding the legitimacy of the intervention). Regional actions have some other advantages: geographic proximity may facilitate rapid and effective deployment; and regional powers are often knowledgeable about local issues of history, religion, ethnicity or politics. Of course, the capacity of regional organisations varies widely, and in any case the work of regional actors can never 'absolve the UN of its primary responsibilities for peace and security' – a point made in the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and expanded on below. Nevertheless, the work of RAMSI is one example of a regional operation playing a critically important security role.[24]

Nationally led
In its generally supportive review of RAMSI's operations, the EPG noted that it 'is perceived as a predominantly Australian exercise.' In this case, perception matches reality. Most of the planning for the mission was done in Canberra, under the guidance of a taskforce led by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and an Interdepartmental Committee run by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Australian Government negotiated the establishment of the mission directly with Honiara, albeit on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum. Both Special

Coordinators (Nick Warner and James Batley), all PPF commanders (Ben McDevitt, Sandi Peisley, and Will Jamieson), and almost all other principals have been Australians. The current Commissioner of the RSIP, Shane Castles, is a former senior AFP officer. Most of the police, soldiers and officials have been Australians, with the only other sizeable contingent provided by New Zealand. The Australian Government has also borne the lion's share of RAMSI's cost (including the cost of most Pacific contingents), in the sum of approximately A$200-250 million per annum.[25]

How has this national leadership affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of the mission? A number of the authorities in the area argue that only the UN, as 'the guardian of the international interest', can bring legitimacy to an external intervention. Certainly it is the case that the UN has unique advantages in this area; furthermore it is not difficult to think of nationally led interventions which are perceived as lacking in legitimacy – Syria's long 'tutelage' of Lebanon and the present US occupation of Iraq, to name two. In Solomons, however, the story is different. RAMSI is not suffering from any lack of legitimacy – if anything, it has *too much* legitimacy, as measured in the regular calls for it to do more and stay longer.[26]

Intuitively one would think that a state-building effort led by a single developed nation such as Australia would have advantages in terms of efficiency. This appears to have been the case in Solomon Islands. Because they were both largely within the power of one state, **mandate** design was simpler and **deployment** quicker than in most multilateral operations. Mandates for UN missions generally have to be negotiated (some would say litigated) between numerous parties; Simon Chesterman notes, for

The Testament of Solomons

instance, that the work of the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia was governed by 70 Security Council resolutions and dozens of statements by the Council President. Similarly deployment of UN missions is sometimes delayed by the lack of on-call personnel and pre-positioned equipment, which can, as Richard Caplan observes, create 'opportunities for spoilers to cause serious and sometimes irreparable damage to a mission.' By contrast, RAMSI's objectives were settled quickly with Honiara and other participating capitals, and the deployment of its personnel began to occur, in an integrated manner, within a week of the Solomon Islands Parliament passing the enabling legislation. Discerning a national interest, Canberra has invested substantial **financial resources** in the mission and spoken consistently of a **long-term** effort, which is usually interpreted as meaning five to ten years.[27]

The national component has yielded some advantages on the **human resources** side. Most RAMSI personnel share a common language and bureaucratic culture, and many have expertise in service delivery, which is rarely the case for international civil servants. The UN now has deep experience, of course, in running transitional administrations; fortunately most of the senior RAMSI people had spent time either in Pacific Island states, UN missions, or both.[28] Furthermore the quality of the personnel deployed in Solomons has been generally high. Some UN staff in the field are first-rate professionals; others are not. A number of studies have pointed to the uneven quality of UN personnel. Thus while RAMSI's human resources ceiling may be the same as a UN mission's, its floor is probably higher. (Not all nationally led missions have been so fortunate: reports indicate that a fair proportion of

staffers within the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq – many of whom were political appointees – were inexperienced and poorly qualified.)[29]

Finally, the **coordination** of Helpem Fren's operations was better than is the case in many other multilateral missions. This was the first integrated mission attempted by the Australian Government, involving not only DFAT, AFP and ADF but AusAID, Treasury, the Department of Finance and many other agencies. There were, therefore, interdepartmental conflicts: 'suffice to say there were some interesting meetings', says one official. However decision-making was certainly made easier by the familiarity of bureaucratic structures and systems and the fact that the planners knew the implementers. As another official told the author, Australia has some advantages in mounting this kind of operation: it is large enough to deploy people, assets and resources at scale, but small enough that personal connections are ubiquitous and collegial habits maintained. Certainly the simplicity of RAMSI's organisational structure (with the Special Coordinator providing direction for the PPF commander, military commander, and development coordinator) is striking compared to the incoherent arrangements in, say, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Pity the poor High Representative in his office in Sarajevo, appointed by the Security Council on the recommendation of the Peace Implementation Council, who has no authority over the Stabilisation Force, and who has to contend with constellations of agencies and acronyms such as the OSCE, EU, UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank and ICRC, between whom the various sectors have been divvied up.[30]

The Testament of Solomons

The scale of the challenge faced in Solomons cannot be compared, of course, to that in Bosnia or many of the other places in which the UN has deployed. Furthermore, as Dennis McNamara has noted, UN peace operations can ultimately only be as effective as states allow them to be. The corollary of the last point is that when a single state with resources and relevant experience has discerned a strong national interest, it is possible to intervene in an effective and legitimate way.[31]

Supported by the United Nations

No blue helmets were deployed in support of RAMSI, nor was it endorsed in a resolution of the UN Security Council. Honiara's close diplomatic and economic relations with Taipei might have prompted a Chinese veto of such a resolution, or at the very least seriously complicated its passage. As a result of concerns about the Chinese position as well as a feeling in Canberra that, in the words of one official, 'little advantage would be gained from an extra layer of bureaucracy', no efforts were made to bring the issue before the Council. However there were ongoing briefings of both the Council and the Secretariat. Importantly for the legitimacy of the operation, there was a laying on of hands by the international community, in the form of statements of support from Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 16 August 2003 and Council President Fayssal Mekdad of Syria on 26 August 2003.[32]

Some critics of the international organisation cite RAMSI's success as part of an argument that the UN is superfluous and its state-building operations could be taken on by regional organisations. This argument is both ahistorical and unrealistic. It is ahistorical because Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter contemplates exactly this kind of regional action, so long as it is consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. It is unrealistic because there is neither appetite nor capacity for further RAMSIs – probably not in the South Pacific and certainly not on the continent with the largest number of failing states, Africa. Rather, activity by regional organisations complements the work of the UN by freeing up the Council to focus on threats to international peace and security that cannot be solved regionally.[33]

It was regrettable, therefore, that the Australian Government took the opportunity posed by RAMSI's creation to put a stick in the UN's eye, referring to the regional effort as a 'coalition of the willing' and stating that multilateralism is increasingly 'a synonym for an ineffective and unfocused policy involving internationalism of the lowest common denominator.' Coming only seven months after Prime Minister Howard's references to possible Australian pre-emptive strikes against the territory of Australia's Asian neighbours and four months after the US-led invasion of Iraq in which Australia participated, these comments by Minister Downer unnecessarily muddied international perceptions of RAMSI. In truth, there is no conflict between RAMSI's design and UN principles; indeed the UN's imprimatur helped to top up the mission's legitimacy. Nor is this the first time that the UN has provided such support to an Australian-led mission: recall the political cover given to the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in Security Council Resolution 1264 (1999).[34]

Non-sovereign

RAMSI has a unique kind of authority in the world of state-building – it has substantial practical influence but it works with and inside the Solomon Islands Government, which

The Testament of Solomons

remains the repository of executive, legislative and judicial authority. The founding documents, such as the statements from the Pacific Islands Forum, refer to RAMSI not as a transitional administration or authority but as an 'assistance package' or a 'framework for strengthened assistance'. The mission's publicity material is even more explicit: 'RAMSI does not control the government or make national decisions on behalf of Solomon Islands. The Parliament, Government, constitutional office holders and the public service all remain responsible for exercising their respective functions, and they remain accountable to the people of Solomon Islands.' Richard Caplan has drawn a continuum of international administrations on which a mission's position is determined by the degree of legal authority it possesses. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is at the 'supervision' pole, and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is at the other, denoting 'direct governance'. The Solomons mission is actually nowhere on this continuum: it does not even have supervisory authority. RAMSI is all about regime maintenance, not regime change.[35]

One could, of course, draw an entirely different state-building continuum, on which a mission's position was determined not by authority but by influence. RAMSI would certainly appear on that continuum, perhaps nearer to UNTAET than UNTAC. The mission's leadership has very great influence in Honiara, based not only on its security and financial contributions to the country but its massive popularity amongst Solomon Islanders. This leverage is institutionalised in the form of so-called 'in-line' officials and police, expatriates who are placed directly into key positions in the Solomons public service or sensitive statutory

positions such as Accountant-General. The in-line experiment was judged to be essential to the achievement of Australia's policy objectives and for achieving immediate results given the lack of local capacity. It causes rumbles of opposition from a few locals, and occasionally insensitive behaviour on the part of RAMSI personnel has led to warnings from observers about a kind of creeping assumption of sovereignty. In fact, though, it is a world apart.

The Solomons mission might have been quite different. The ASPI proposal, for instance, was for a Solomon Islands Rehabilitation Authority (SIRA), an 'independent legal authority' established to 'take over the government of Solomon Islands' in the areas of law and order and financial management. The Solomon Islands Government would have continued to run the remaining policy areas, though with substantial input from SIRA.[36]

The approach eventually adopted by Canberra and operationalised as RAMSI was a better model than SIRA, for four reasons. First, it was achievable. It is unlikely that the Solomon Islands Government, or the Pacific community more generally, would have accepted a greater assumption of sovereignty. Solomons politicians only reluctantly agreed to in-line advisers, for instance, and many are probably now regretting that decision. Because of the preventive nature of the mission, consent for a takeover would not have been forthcoming, and if the intervention had proceeded without consent then regional and international support would not have been secured either. In other words, the different elements of the mission design were interconnected. Second, it was in the mission's interests, keeping it 'above politics' and preventing it from assuming the slightly monarchical bearing for which the

The Testament of Solomons

interventions in East Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been criticised.[37]

Third, it was in the Solomons' interests. The alpha and omega of state-building is increasing indigenous capacity so that responsibility can be returned to the locals. The more existing institutions can be strengthened, the better. International practice and common sense would say it is inadvisable to drain current institutions, such as the Solomon Islands Government, of their legitimacy if there is an opportunity to boost them instead. Finally, it was in the interests of the contributing states, in particular Australia. If the mission had assumed formal authority, how would it return it, and to whom? The risks and costs of the operation would have been increased – and getting out of Solomons would have been near impossible.

The RAMSI model is not without hazards, of course. The biggest risk is that Honiara could revoke the consent it has granted: that movements in the Solomons political elite – especially after the forthcoming election – could deprive RAMSI of its patrons and result in its exit.[38] This is certainly not a trivial risk, although the popular support for the mission would mean any government requesting that RAMSI depart would suffer very serious political pain. In fact, however, if Solomon Islanders' elected representatives were ever to demand the departure of an international mission then it would have no option but to comply. The alternative – to remain in situ in the teeth of the legitimate government's opposition – would surely be unthinkable.

Police led
The establishment of internal security and the rule of law is an essential precondition for successful state-building: in the words of one experienced UN official, it is 'the cement which holds the bricks of peace operations together.'[39] The absence of security has bedevilled any number of interventions. RAMSI achieved notable success by adopting a dual approach: the mission was police led but backed by overwhelming military force at the time of entry.

There have been many peace operations with substantial police components performing law and order tasks, most notably the UN missions in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor but also, for example, several of the missions to Haiti, the UN Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMBIH) and the UN Civilian Police Support Group to Croatia (UNPSG). But none of these missions were police led to the same extent as RAMSI. Whereas UN CIVPOL contingents have often been painfully slow to deploy, a sizeable PPF element was in the first wave of RAMSI's deployment. In Solomons, the PPF took the lead role in planning and executing operations and the military contingent provided support for them; only the PPF had powers of independent arrest. Furthermore whereas UN officials and observers have noted that CIVPOL contingents are often under-trained and variable in quality, the PPF contingent, with the benefit of a more consistent policing philosophy, has received relatively high marks from observers. If civilian policing is 'the Achilles heel' of UN peacekeeping, it has been one of RAMSI's notable strengths. The police led nature of the intervention was, admittedly, conditioned by the comparatively benign security environment in Solomon and the fact that RSIP was complicit in the widespread criminality. Nevertheless, it must be counted a successful innovation.[40]

The Testament of Solomons

One of the reasons that the PPF was able to do its work effectively was the cover provided by the large military force deployed along with the police. The decision in favour of a significant military force was taken over the objections of elements of the New Zealand Government, which thought it may appear militaristic, and was regarded by some experts as unnecessary. However in retrospect it was correct. As Special Coordinator Nick Warner said: 'we came in with a very large potent military force… We did that quite deliberately so that we didn't have to use military force during this operation, and it worked. We got the attention very quickly of the militants and the thugs and the criminals, and they made a very correct strategic decision – that is, that it was better to cooperate with us than to take us on.' Solomon Islanders interviewed by this author agreed: one said 'it showed you mean business'; another described the ADF component as 'Australian shock and awe.' When Weather Coast militant leader Harold Keke was arrested in August 2003, an Australian warship was sitting at anchor in sight of Guadalcanal's southern shore. Any fears that Wellington may have had about the military component were dispelled by the low key, disciplined and professional way in which the personnel conducted themselves.[41]

Light touch

Finally, one of the striking things about RAMSI to an outside visitor with experience of other international interventions is the relative lightness of touch it exhibits. Physically it adopts a fairly low profile. RAMSI arrived in Solomons under cover of darkness. The main contingent is located on an old resort out near the airport, with no sight lines to the road – as opposed to the grand government buildings in the centre of town occupied by the UN in Dili and the CPA in Baghdad. One result of this

basing decision was that the infamous white four-wheel drives are out of sight. A 'no fraternisation' policy, designed to avoid prostitution and other unattractive spillover effects, has largely been followed. The Special Coordinators have been well known but they have worn their office lightly, without bodyguards, seals, flags of office or other paraphernalia. Most of the police have been unarmed from the first. This point should not be exaggerated: RAMSI's presence is noticeable, especially in Honiara, where the influx of expatriates has increased certain living costs. But compared to some other international administrations the profile is low.

The mission has also undertaken diligent and largely successful efforts to communicate with Solomon Islanders, starting with the use of pidgin in the mission title 'Operation Helpem Fren'. (By contrast Chesterman notes that the acronym for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) sounded dangerously close to 'anmik', which in the dialect of Albanian spoken in Kosovo means 'enemy'.) One innovation has been an AusAID-funded talkback radio program called 'Talking Truth', which has travelled all over Solomon Islands and provided a neutral, non-political forum in which ordinary people can question senior RAMSI officials and Solomon Islands politicians on air – an entirely new experience for most local people. All this adds up to an openness and humility which is entirely appropriate for an international mission.[42]

The future of RAMSI

Rebuilding a fragile state is a difficult task, one that cannot be achieved quickly. So far RAMSI has made good progress. It has started the

The Testament of Solomons

country on a new trajectory. The mission will need to navigate three main challenges, however, if that course is to be maintained:

▪ *Preserve political support*

Whereas the restoration of law and order served the interests of the Solomons elite, the current concentration on economic reform and clean government threatens some of those interests. Already we have seen mischief-making by some Cabinet ministers and constitutional challenges to RAMSI's existence, and sovereignty concerns may be voiced more loudly in the lead-up to the 5 April 2006 election. For the reasons stated above it is unlikely that a future government will ask RAMSI to leave but clearly the mission will have to be very skilful in the way it works with a new government if Kemakeza is not re-elected Prime Minister.

▪ *Help Solomon Islanders address the tensions' root causes*

Many of the underlying causes of the tensions – including land ownership and inter-community problems – remain unresolved. RAMSI initially took the view that it was not the mission's job to address these issues, but rather to create space for Solomon Islanders to do it themselves. In recent months RAMSI's view has developed as it became apparent that if it does not help to facilitate discussion on these issues it may never happen. These efforts need to accelerate once the election season is over and a new government has been elected in Honiara.

▪ *Start thinking about how to leave*

Since the deployment of RAMSI the Australian Government has been at pains to stress that this is a long-term commitment. This assurance is both rare and welcome. On the other hand, an open-ended commitment would not be in anyone's interests: not the Solomons, which needs to return to a self-sustaining state at some point; and not Australia, for which the RAMSI deployment is hugely expensive in terms of both financial and human resources. RAMSI needs to focus intensely, therefore, on two tasks where insufficient progress has been made to date: building indigenous capacity so that responsibility can be handed back within a reasonable time-frame; and setting public goals by which its own performance can be measured. Identifying the end-game is the first step towards completing it.

Conclusion

If RAMSI's challenges are daunting, that only proves how difficult state-building is for the international community. These tests are common to all such international interventions, and RAMSI has met them better than most. We should hesitate before applying all of RAMSI's lessons to other situations: it is not difficult to think of state-building efforts led by one country that are troubled, or state-building efforts led by a neighbour that are toxic. Nevertheless, RAMSI has been an innovative and pragmatic response to conditions in one small country, and the design of the mission – preventive, permissive, regionally-mandated, nationally-led, UN-supported, non-sovereign, police led and light touch – is worthy of continuing close observation.

In his book *Present at the Creation*, former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote about the enormity of the task facing US foreign policy makers in 1945. He said it appeared only a little 'less formidable than that described in the first chapter of Genesis… to create a world out of chaos.'[43] The testament of

The Testament of Solomons

Solomons is that it is almost as hard to build a single state out of chaos – that even in the best of conditions, it is hard, slow work. Usually the responsibility for this work is divided, but in RAMSI's case the accountabilities are fairly clear: the lead contributor, Australia, has chained its credibility in the Pacific to success in the Solomons. Having devised a new kind of model for the intervention, Canberra and its partners now need to ensure it succeeds.

The Testament of Solomons

Interviews conducted

Name	Position at the time of interview
James Batley	Special Coordinator, RAMSI
Anita Butler	Deputy High Commissioner, Australian High Commission, Honiara
Bill Campbell QC	General Counsel, Office of International Law, Attorney-General's Department
Alison Chartres	Acting Development Coordinator, RAMSI
Marion Crawshaw	Pacific Division, MFAT
Chris Elstoft	Pacific Islands Branch, DFAT
Peter Forau	Permanent Secretary, Solomon Islands Department for Foreign Affairs
Beth Greener-Barcham	Massey University
Johnson Hanuma	Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation
Murray Harris	Solomon Islands Section, DFAT
George Hiele	Permanent Secretary, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Solomon Islands
Dr Birger Heldt	Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden
LTCOL John Hutcheson	Commander, Combined Joint Taskforce
Sue Ingram	Machinery of Government, RAMSI
Robert Iroga	Chief of Staff, Solomons Star
Marie-Louise O'Callaghan	Journalist
Valery Masurin	Department of Political Affairs, United Nations
Ben McDevitt	Commander, PPF
Sandi Peisley	Commander, PPF
Heather Riddell	NZAid
Paul Tovua	Chairman, National Peace Council
Dr Elsina Wainwright	Program Director, Strategy & International, ASPI
Catherine Walker	Development Coordinator, RAMSI
Nick Warner	Special Coordinator, RAMSI
Ric Wells	South Pacific, Africa and Middle East Division, DFAT
Professor Hugh White	Director, Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, ANU
Dorothy Wickham	Journalist, Radio Australia

A number of other interviews are not listed for reasons of confidentiality.

The Testament of Solomons

NOTES

[1] In relation to such activity see e.g. Stuart E. Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, Rebuilding weak states. *Foreign Affairs* 84 (1) 2005, p.134; Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, *Investing in prevention: an international strategy to manage risks of instability and improve crisis response*. February 2005:
http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_risk/report/pdf/Investing.pdf;
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/keyaid/fragile_activities.cfm; United Nations General Assembly, *2005 World Summit Outcome*. United Nations 23 September 2005: http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html,
para.97-105; Kofi A. Annan, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: report of the Secretary-General*. United Nations A/59/2005 2005:
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm
para.115; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility* United Nations 2004:
http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf,
para.261-269.

[2] Francis Fukuyama, The imperative of state-building. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (2) 2004, p.18; Einsiedel chapter in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Making states work: state failure and the crisis of governance*. Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005, pp.13-14; Stephen D. Krasner and Carlos Pascual, Addressing state failure. *Foreign Affairs* 84 (4) 2005, p. 153; Task Force on the United Nations, *American interests and UN reform: report of the Task Force on the United Nations*. United States Institute of Peace 2005:
http://www.usip.org/un/report/index.html, p.90;
Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, Saving failed states. *Foreign Policy* 89 1992-93, p.3; President of the United States, *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. 2002: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

[3] Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, *Lessons from the past: the American record on nation building*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003: http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief24.pdf, p.1; Marina Ottaway, Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. *Development and Change* 33 (5) 2002, p.1002.

[4] Regarding the importance of contextual factors to mission success see Richard D. Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.13, 251. Regarding the perils of 'best practices', see Ottaway, Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states, pp.1008-1009.

[5] These two definitions are contained in Sebastian von Einsiedel, Policy responses to state failure, in *Making states work: state failure and the crisis of governance*. ed. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur. Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005, pp.15-16; Sinclair Dinnen, *Lending a fist? Australia's new interventionism in the Southwest Pacific*. State Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2004/5, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 2004, p.6.

[6] Regarding state-building, see Richard Caplan, International authority and state building: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Global Governance* 10 (1) 2004, p.53; regarding nation-building, see Francis Fukuyama, *State-building: governance and world order in the twenty-first century*. London, Profile Books, 2004, p.134; regarding peace-building see Simon Chesterman, *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.4-5.

[7] Gerard A. Finin and Terence Wesley-Smith, Coups, conflicts and crises: the new Pacific Way? *Race and Class* 42 (4) 2001, p.7; Judith Bennett, *Roots of*

The Testament of Solomons

conflict in Solomon Islands. Though much is taken, much abides: legacies of tradition and colonialism. Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 2002: http://eprints.anu.edu.au/archive/00002123/01/bennett02-5.pdf; Jane Turnbull, Solomon Islands: blending traditional power and modern structures in the state. *Public Administration and Development* 22 (2) 2002, p.194.

[8] Clive Moore, *Happy isles in crisis: the historical causes for a failing state in Solomon Islands, 1998-2004.* Canberra, Asia Pacific Press, 2004; Amnesty International, *Solomon Islands: a forgotten conflict,* ASA 43/005/2000, 7 September 2000; Elsina Wainwright, *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands.* Barton, A.C.T., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003, pp.21-22; *Special parliament meeting called next week to remove Prime Minister.* [Factiva]. Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association News Service 7 June 2000; John Wright, Coup 2 - double jeopardy in the Pacific. *Courier Mail* 2000, p. 1. As Solomon Islands has no military, the RSIP is the principal state security force.

[9] Carol Nelson and Robert Muggah, *Solomon Islands: evaluating the Weapons Free Village campaign: an independent report commissioned by the Small Arms Survey.* 2004: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/other.htm p.9; David Hegarty, *Intervention, regionalism, engagement: new forms of security management in the South Pacific* 2004: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/working_papers/04_03wp_Hegarty.pdf, p.11; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Solomon Islands: rebuilding an island economy.* Barton, A.C.T., 2004, Chapter 1; Sinclair Dinnen, *Guns, money and politics: disorder in the Solomon Islands.* Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 2003: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/conflict/dinnen_solom

ons.pdf, p.4.; Elsina Wainwright, Responding to state failure - the case of Australia and Solomon Islands. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (3) 2003, p.487; AusAID, *Case study: Solomon Islands. A strategic path to recovery and reform* (paper presented at the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, London, 2005).

[10] Alexander Downer, Neighbours cannot be recolonised. *The Australian*, 8 January 2003, p.11.

[11] Canberra's Framework for Strengthened Assistance is extracted in the Solomon Islands Government, *Policy statement on the offer by the Government of Australia for strengthened assistance to Solomon Islands 2003.* Honiara, 2003. ASPI's report was Wainwright, *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands.*

[12] Pacific Islands Forum, *Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, 30 June 2003, Sydney, Australia: Outcome Statement.* 2003: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/ffamm_solomons_0306.html; Fr Sir John Ini Lapli, GCMG, *Letter to The Honourable John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia, 4 July 2003*; Solomon Islands Parliament, *The Facilitation of International Assistance Act (No. 1 of 2003)*, 2003; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga concerning the operations and status of the police and armed forces and other personnel deployed to Solomon Islands to assist in the restoration of law and order and security.* 2003: http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/solomon_islands_short-term.pdf (hereafter 'Agreement between Participating States').

[13] See John Howard, *Ministerial statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 12 August 2003.* http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html; also his interview with Charles Wooley, John

The Testament of Solomons

Howard, *Interview with Charles Wooley, 60 Minutes, 20 July 2003*. http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview381.html. In October 2003 President George W. Bush told the parliament that through its 'principled actions' in East Timor and Solomon Islands, 'Australia is leading the way to peace in South-East Asia': see Mark Forbes and Brendan Nicholson, Australia must keep the peace: Bush. *The Age*, 24 October 2003, p.4.

[14] Interviews with RAMSI and DFAT personnel; RAMSI fact sheets; Peter Londey, *Other people's wars: a history of Australian peacekeeping*. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 2004, pp.227-229.

[15] Ben McDevitt, *Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) - a police command perspective: an address to the United Services Institute, Canberra, November 3, 2004*. Royal United Services Institute of Australia Incorporated 2004: http://www.defence.gov.au/rusi/state/act%20lectures%20McDevitt.htm; Nick Warner, *Operation Helpem Fren: Biketawa's first success: speech at the Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting in Nadi, 17 June*. 2004: http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/040617_security_committee_meeting.html; RAMSI fact sheets; Lakhdar Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. United Nations 2000: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/, para.37.

[16] Dennis McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech* (paper presented at the UNITAR-IPS-JIIA Conference on 'UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons', Tokyo, 16-18 September 2002), p.2, and Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the path to independence*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.105.

[17] Interviews with RAMSI, DFAT and MFAT personnel; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Solomon Islands: rebuilding an island economy*, pp.25-27; International Monetary Fund, *Solomon Islands: 2005 Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion*. IMF country report No. 05/365 2005: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05365.pdf, p.4.

[18] McDevitt, *Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) - a police command perspective: an address to the United Services Institute, Canberra, November 3, 2004*; Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, *Mission Helpem Fren: a review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*. May 2005: http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/special/Forum_RAMSI_review.pdf, para.27; Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard Brown, Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands. *International Peacekeeping* 12 (4) 2005, note 7; Tom Dusevic, After the storm. *Time International (South Pacific edition)*, 6 December 2004, p.16.

[19] Richard Ponzio, The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing. *International Peacekeeping* 12 (2) 2005, pp.178-179; Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair, *States at risk and failed states: putting security first*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Ottaway_outlook3.pdf, pp.1-2; Eizenstat, Porter and Weinstein, Rebuilding weak states, p.140; Robert I. Rotberg, The new nature of nation-state failure. *Washington Quarterly* 25 (3) 2002, pp.94-96.

[20] See the comments by former New Zealand ambassador to the UN Terence O'Brien in Kevin Norquay, *No option other to support Solomon Islands force, Goff says*. [Factiva]. New Zealand Press Association 10 July 2003. On permissive interventions generally, see Michael O'Connor, Rebuilding the Solomons: a case study in developing principles for permissive intervention. *Australian Army Journal* 1 (2) 2003.

The Testament of Solomons

[21] Article 2, Biketawa Declaration, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. "*Biketawa*" *Declaration: press statement 5200* 2000: http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2000/Oct06.htm; Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, *Mission Helpem Fren: a review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*; RAMSI fact sheets. Ponzio presents the regional element as a figleaf for Australian action: Ponzio, The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing, p.177.

[22] Wainwright, *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands*, pp.48-50.

[23] Peake and Brown, Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands, p.525; Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, *Mission Helpem Fren: a review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, para.10.

[24] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI yearbook 2004: armaments, disarmament and international security*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp.155-164 and Table 4.3; Project Ploughshares, *UN peacekeeping/observer/enforcement missions in 2003*. 2004: http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ACR04/Peacekeeping_Map.pdf; Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations. *International Security* 29 (4) 2005, *passim*; Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen, *Peacekeeping operations: global patterns of intervention and success, 1948-2000*. Research report no. 1. Sandovagen, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2004, pp.8-12; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, para.270-272.

[25] Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, *Mission Helpem Fren: a review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*, para.10; for RAMSI's cost over 2005-2009 see the *Australian Government Budget 2005-06: Budget Paper No. 2.*

http://www.budget.gov.au/2005-06/bp2/html/expense-13.htm.

[26] Ponzio, The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing, pp.183-184; *The future of UN state-building: strategic and operational challenges and the legacy of Iraq*. International Peace Academy 2003: http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/FUTURE_OF_UN_STATE_BUILDING.pdf, p.2; Tarcisius T. Kabutaulaka, '*Failed state' and the war on terror: intervention in Solomon Islands*. 2004: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api072.pdf, p.2.

[27] Chesterman, *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*, p.240; Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, pp.55, 237-244. The most succinct statement of RAMSI's mission is found in Article 2 of the Agreement between Participating States. On its time frame, see Howard, *Ministerial statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 12 August 2003*; and AusAID, *Case study: Solomon Islands. A strategic path to recovery and reform*, p.12.

[28] For one international civil servant's account of the challenge of suddenly managing service delivery, see McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*, p.3. Nick Warner, the first Special Coordinator, was formerly High Commissioner in Port Moresby; his successor James Batley is a former head of mission in Dili and Honiara, has served in Vanuatu, PNG and on Bougainville, and speaks pidgin; the first PPF Commander Ben McDevitt had previously served in Cyprus, Bougainville and as an adviser to the RSIP Commissioner; his successor Sandi Peisley served in Cyprus and was Commissioner of the UN Civilian Police contingent in East Timor.

[29] On UN personnel, see e.g. Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, para.270; Caplan, *International governance of war-*

The Testament of Solomons

torn territories: rule and reconstruction, p.165-166; Chesterman, *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*, p.248; Peake and Brown, Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands, pp.527-528; McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*, p.3. On the quality of CPA staff, see George Packer, *The assassins' gate*, p.184; Jim Krane, *GOP operatives lead at Iraq press office.* [Factiva]. Associated Press Newswires 4 April 2004; Joshua Micah Marshall, Laura Rosen and Colin Soloway, *The Washington Monthly's Who's Who December 2003: Special Baghdad edition.* 2003: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0 312.whoswho.html. On staffing shortfalls, see James Glanz, Iraq rebuilding badly hobbled, US report finds. *New York Times*, 24 January 2006, p.1.

[30] On the importance (and the difficulty) of coordination in the field, see e.g. High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, para.226; Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, pp.175-176; Peake and Brown, Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands, pp.524-525. On the Bosnian situation, see Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, pp.34-36, and in particular Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for collapsed and failing states. *International Security* 29 (2) 2004, pp.101-102, from which my summary is drawn.

[31] McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*, p.4.

[32] Kofi Annan, *Secretary-General praises expanded cooperation between UN, Pacific Islands Forum in message to New Zealand meeting [delivered by Mark Malloch Brown].* UN press release SG/SM/8821; United Nations. *Press statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President, 26 August 2003* SC/7853 2003:

http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc 7853.html.

[33] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations.* http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/, Chapter VIII, in particular Articles 52 and 54. On the relationship between the UN and regional organizations, see High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, para.270 and 272; Annan, *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: report of the Secretary-General*, para.213-215.

[34] Minister Downer was quoted in John Kerin, Regional posse goes where UN unable to tread - the Solomons intervention. *The Australian*, 27 June 2003, p.6; Alexander Downer, *Security in an unstable world: speech at the National Press Club.* 26 June 2003:

www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_ unstableworld.html. For Prime Minister Howard's comments on pre-emption see John Howard, *Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP interview with Laurie Oakes, Sunday, Channel 9.* 1 December 2002:

http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2002/intervie w2015.htm; Brendan Nicholson, Howard defiant: I would launch strike. *The Age*, 20 September 2004, p. 7. For a critical view of RAMSI from a former UNDP official, see Ponzio, The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing, especially pp.178-186.

[35] Pacific Islands Forum, *Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, 30 June 2003, Sydney, Australia: Outcome Statement.* ; Solomon Islands Government, *Policy statement on the offer by the Government of Australia for strengthened assistance to Solomon Islands 2003*; RAMSI fact sheets; Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, pp.17-21; Alexander Downer, *Doorstop - Parliament House, 25 June 2003.* www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030625_do orstop.html; Phil Goff, *A move to succeed where*

The Testament of Solomons

colonial powers failed. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2003: http://www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/speeches/goffcomment.html. Ponzio disagrees, labelling RAMSI a 'quasi-transitional administration': Ponzio, The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing, p.179. RAMSI's legal personality is actually difficult to discern: there are few clear statements as to its constitution, objectives or timetable, although the status of the visiting contingent and participating police and armed forces are set out in the Agreement between Participating States and the Facilitation of International Assistance Act. This reflects RAMSI's lack of formal authority but also provides valuable 'wiggle room' to the mission and its main sponsors.

[36] Wainwright, *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands*, pp.38-39, 48-52.

[37] For such criticisms of the administrations in East Timor and Bosnia, see Jarat Chopra, The UN's kingdom of East Timor. *Survival* 42 (3) 2000 and Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj. *Journal of Democracy* 14 (3) 2003.

[38] Elsina Wainwright, *How is RAMSI faring: progress, challenges, and lessons learned.* Barton, A.C.T., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, pp.5-6.

[39] McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*, p.3; see also Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, p.45.

[40] Personal communications with Dr Birger Heldt, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 21-28 June 2005; McNamara, *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*, p.3; Caplan, *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*, pp.46-60; High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*, para.223; Peake and Brown, Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands, *passim*;

Wainwright, *How is RAMSI faring: progress, challenges, and lessons learned*, p.493.

[41] Wainwright, *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands*, pp.41-42; Nick Warner, *Interview with Hamish Robertson, ABC Radio AM program, 24 July 2004*. 2004: http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1160956.htm.

[42] Chesterman, *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*, p.236.

[43] Dean Acheson, *Present at the creation: my years in the State Department.* London, Hamish Hamilton, 1969, Apologia pro libre hoc.

The Testament of Solomons

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the creation: my years in the State Department*. London, Hamish Hamilton, 1969.

Amnesty International. *Solomon Islands: a forgotten conflict* ASA 43/005/2000. 7 September 2000.

Annan, Kofi. *Secretary-General praises expanded cooperation between UN, Pacific Islands Forum in message to New Zealand meeting [delivered by Mark Malloch Brown]*. UN press release SG/SM/8821.

———. *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: report of the Secretary-General*. United Nations A/59/2005 2005: http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm.

AusAID. *Case study: Solomon Islands. A strategic path to recovery and reform*. Paper presented at the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States, London 2005.

Australian Government Budget 2005-06: Budget Paper No. 2. http://www.budget.gov.au/2005-06/bp2/html/expense-13.htm.

Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams. Who's keeping the peace? Regionalization and contemporary peace operations. *International Security* 29 (4) 2005, pp.157-195.

Bennett, Judith. *Roots of conflict in Solomon Islands. Though much is taken, much abides: legacies of tradition and colonialism*. Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 2002: http://eprints.anu.edu.au/archive/00002123/01/bennett02-5.pdf.

Brahimi, Lakhdar. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. United Nations 2000: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

Caplan, Richard. International authority and state building: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Global Governance* 10 (1) 2004, pp.53-65.

———. *International governance of war-torn territories: rule and reconstruction*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005.

Chesterman, Simon. *You, the people: the United Nations, transitional administration, and state-building*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Chesterman, Simon, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, eds. *Making states work: state failure and the crisis of governance*. Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005.

Chopra, Jarat. The UN's kingdom of East Timor. *Survival* 42 (3) 2000, pp.27-39.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. *Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, and Tonga concerning the operations and status of the police and armed*

The Testament of Solomons

forces and other personnel deployed to Solomon Islands to assist in the restoration of law and order and security. 2003: http://www.dfat.gov.au/treaties/solomon_islands_short-term.pdf.

———. *Solomon Islands: rebuilding an island economy.* Barton, A.C.T., 2004.

Dinnen, Sinclair. *Guns, money and politics: disorder in the Solomon Islands.* Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 2003: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/conflict/dinnen_solomons.pdf.

———. *Lending a fist? Australia's new interventionism in the Southwest Pacific.* State Society and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2004/5. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 2004.

Downer, Alexander. *Doorstop - Parliament House, 25 June 2003.* www.dfat.gov.au/media/transcripts/2003/030625_doorstop.html.

———. Neighbours cannot be recolonised. *The Australian*, 8 January 2003, p.11.

———. *Security in an unstable world: speech at the National Press Club.* 26 June 2003: www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2003/030626_unstableworld.html.

Dusevic, Tom. After the storm. *Time International (South Pacific edition)*, 6 December 2004, p.16.

Einsiedel, Sebastian von. Policy responses to state failure. In *Making states work: state failure and the crisis of governance*, edited by Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur, pp.13-35. Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2005.

Eizenstat, Stuart E., John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein. Rebuilding weak states. *Foreign Affairs* 84 (1) 2005, pp.134-146.

Finin, Gerard A. and Terence Wesley-Smith. Coups, conflicts and crises: the new Pacific Way? *Race and Class* 42 (4) 2001, pp.1-16.

Forbes, Mark and Brendan Nicholson. Australia must keep the peace: Bush. *The Age*, 24 October 2003, p.4.

Fukuyama, Francis. The imperative of state-building. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (2) 2004, pp.17-31.

———. *State-building: governance and world order in the twenty-first century.* London, Profile Books, 2004.

Future of UN state-building: strategic and operational challenges and the legacy of Iraq. International Peace Academy 2003: http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/FUTURE_OF_UN_STATE_BUILDING.pdf.

Glanz, James. Iraq rebuilding badly hobbled, US report finds. *New York Times*, 24 January 2006, p.1.

Goff, Phil. *A move to succeed where colonial powers failed.* New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade 2003: http://www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/speeches/goffcomment.html.

Hegarty, David. *Intervention, regionalism, engagement: new forms of security management in the South Pacific* 2004: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/melanesia/working_papers/04_03wp_Hegarty.pdf.

The Testament of Solomons

Heldt, Birger and Wallensteen, Peter. *Peacekeeping operations: global patterns of intervention and success, 1948-2000*. Research report no. 1. Sandovagen, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2004.

Helman, Gerald B. and Ratner, Steven R., Saving failed states. *Foreign Policy* 89 1992-93, pp.3-20.

High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change. *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*. United Nations 2004: http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.

Howard, John. *Interview with Charles Wooley, 60 Minutes, 20 July 2003*. http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview381.html.

———. *Ministerial statement to Parliament on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). 12 August 2003*. http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech422.html.

———. *Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP interview with Laurie Oakes, Sunday, Channel 9*. 1 December 2002: http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2002/interview2015.htm.

International Monetary Fund. *Solomon Islands: 2005 Article IV Consultation - Staff Report; and Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion*. IMF country report No. 05/365 2005: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05365.pdf.

Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius T. '*Failed state' and the war on terror: intervention in Solomon Islands*. 2004: http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api072.pdf.

Kerin, John. Regional posse goes where UN unable to tread – the Solomons intervention. *The Australian*, 27 June 2003, p.6.

Knaus, Gerald and Martin, Felix. Travails of the European Raj. *Journal of Democracy* 14 (3) 2003, pp.60-74.

Krane, Jim. *GOP operatives lead at Iraq press office*. [Factiva]. Associated Press Newswires 4 April 2004.

Krasner, Stephen D. Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for collapsed and failing states. *International Security* 29 (2) 2004, pp.85-120.

Krasner, Stephen D. and Pascual, Carlos. Addressing state failure. *Foreign Affairs* 84 (4) 2005, pp.153-163.

Lapli, Fr Sir John Ini, GCMG. *Letter to The Honourable John Howard MP, Prime Minister of Australia, 4 July 2003*.

Londey, Peter. *Other people's wars: a history of Australian peacekeeping*. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin, 2004.

Marshall, Joshua Micah, Rosen, Laura and Soloway, Colin. *The Washington Monthly's Who's Who December 2003: Special Baghdad edition*. 2003: http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0312.whoswho.html.

McDevitt, Ben. *Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) - a police command perspective: an address to the United Services Institute, Canberra, November 3, 2004*. Royal United Services Institute of Australia Incorporated 2004: http://www.defence.gov.au/rusi/state/act%20lectures%20McDevitt.htm.

The Testament of Solomons

McNamara, Dennis. *A post-independence view of UNTAET: keynote speech*. Paper presented at the UNITAR-IPS-JIIA Conference on "UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons", Tokyo, 16-18 September 2002.

Moore, Clive. *Happy isles in crisis: the historical causes for a failing state in Solomon Islands, 1998-2004*. Canberra, Asia Pacific Press, 2004.

Nelson, Carol and Muggah, Robert. *Solomon Islands: evaluating the Weapons Free Village campaign: an independent report commissioned by the Small Arms Survey*. 2004: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/other.htm.

Nicholson, Brendan. Howard defiant: I would launch strike. *The Age*, 20 September 2004, p.7.

Norquay, Kevin. *No option other to support Solomon Islands force, Goff says*. [Factiva]. New Zealand Press Association 10 July 2003.

O'Connor, Michael. Rebuilding the Solomons: a case study in developing principles for permissive intervention. *Australian Army Journal* 1 (2) 2003, pp.121-127.

Ottaway, Marina. Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. *Development and Change* 33 (5) 2002, pp.1001-1023.

Ottaway, Marina and Mair, Stefan. *States at risk and failed states: putting security first*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Ottaway_outlook3.pdf.

Pacific Islands Forum. *Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting, 30 June 2003, Sydney, Australia: Outcome Statement*. 2003: http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regional_orgs/ffamm_solomons_0306.html.

Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group. *Mission Helpem Fren: a review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands*. May 2005:
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/special/Forum_RAMSI_review.pdf.

Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. "*Biketawa*" *Declaration: press statement 5200*. 2000:
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2000/Oct06.htm.

Packer, George. *The assassins' gate*: *America in Iraq*. New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

Peake, Gordon and Brown, Kaysie Studdard. Policebuilding: the International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands. *International Peacekeeping* 12 (4) 2005, pp.520-532.

Pei, Minxin and Kasper, Sara. *Lessons from the past: the American record on nation building*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2003:
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief24.pdf.

Ponzio, Richard. The Solomon Islands: the UN and intervention by coalitions of the willing. *International Peacekeeping* 12 (2) 2005, pp.173-188.

The Testament of Solomons

President of the United States, *The national security strategy of the United States of America*. 2002: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.

Prime Minister's Strategy Unit. *Investing in prevention: an international strategy to manage risks of instability and improve crisis response*. February 2005: http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_risk/report/pdf/Investing.pdf.

Project Ploughshares. *UN peacekeeping/observer/enforcement missions in 2003*. 2004: http://www.ploughshares.ca/imagesarticles/ACR04/Peacekeeping_Map.pdf.

Rotberg, Robert I. The new nature of nation-state failure. *Washington Quarterly* 25 (3) 2002, pp.85-96.

Smith, Michael G. and Dee, Moreen. *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the path to independence*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003.

Solomon Islands Government. *Policy statement on the offer by the Government of Australia for strengthened assistance to Solomon Islands 2003*. Honiara, 2003.

Solomon Islands Parliament. *The Facilitation of International Assistance Act (No. 1 of 2003)*. 2003.

Special parliament meeting called next week to remove Prime Minister. [Factiva]. Pacific Islands Broadcasting Association News Service 7 June 2000.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *SIPRI yearbook 2004: armaments, disarmament and international security*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Task Force on the United Nations. *American interests and UN reform: report of the Task Force on the United Nations*. United States Institute of Peace 2005: http://www.usip.org/un/report/index.html.

Turnbull, Jane. Solomon Islands: blending traditional power and modern structures in the state. *Public Administration and Development* 22 (2) 2002, pp.191-201.

United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.

———. *Press statement on Solomon Islands by Security Council President, 26 August 2003*. SC/7853 2003: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sc7853.html.

United Nations General Assembly. *2005 World Summit Outcome*. United Nations 23 September 2005: http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html.

Wainwright, Elsina. *How is RAMSI faring: progress, challenges, and lessons learned*. Barton, A.C.T., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005.

———. *Our failing neighbour: Australia and the future of Solomon Islands*. Barton, A.C.T., Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2003.

———. Responding to state failure - the case of Australia and Solomon Islands. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57 (3) 2003, pp.485-498.

The Testament of Solomons

Warner, Nick. *Interview with Hamish Robertson, ABC Radio AM program, 24 July 2004*. 2004: http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1160956.htm.

———. *Operation Helpem Fren: Biketawa's first success: speech at the Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting in Nadi, 17 June*. 2004: http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/040617_security_committee_meeting.html.

Wright, John. Coup 2 – double jeopardy in the Pacific. *Courier Mail* 2000, p.1.

About the author

Dr Michael Fullilove directs the global issues program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. Previously he worked as a lawyer, a volunteer in the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and an adviser to Prime Minister Paul Keating. He was a consultant to Frank Lowy AC on the establishment of the Lowy Institute.

Michael graduated in government and law from the Universities of Sydney and New South Wales, with dual university medals. He also studied as a Rhodes Scholar at the University of Oxford, where he earned a master's degree in international relations and wrote his doctorate on Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy. His dissertation was awarded the annual prize for the best international history thesis in Britain.

Michael publishes regularly in Australian and international newspapers and journals such as the *Sydney Morning Herald*, *Age*, *Australian*, *Financial Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Times Literary Supplement*, and *Foreign Affairs*, and has provided commentary for broadcasters such as the ABC, SBS, Bloomberg, and CNN. His Lowy Institute publications include *Angels & Dragons: Asia, the UN, Reform and the Next Secretary-General*, and *Diaspora: The World-Wide Web of Australians* (with Dr Chloë Flutter). Michael's first book, *'Men and Women of Australia!' Our Greatest Modern Speeches*, was published by Vintage in November 2005.